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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper recovers consumer search cost estimates in airline markets consistent 
with theoretical search models. We follow an empirical framework developed in the 
recent literature on the structural estimation of search models to retrieve information on 
consumer search costs using price information. A unique data set of airline fares coupled 
with detailed ticket characteristics allows us to utilize this framework. We work in this 
paper with non-refundable and restricted tickets. Results show that the magnitude of 
search costs borne by air travelers in our ticket group is economically important. 
Specifically, search cost means vary between 4.75% and 8.12% of the mean route fare 
across markets and can be as high as US$58 for certain consumers in our sample. 
Consistent with previous work in other markets, our estimates indicate that most 
consumers sample just a few prices before buying while a relative small fraction of 
consumers search intensively. Results suggest that consumer search cost plays an 
important role in explaining part of the price dispersion observed in the airline industry.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
  
The pervasiveness of price dispersion is now well-known.  Abundant theoretical and 
empirical literature addresses the effect of numerous factors in driving price dispersion. 
In particular, consumer search cost has received considerable attention from theoretical 
economists especially after Stigler’s (1961) seminal paper “The Economics of 
Information”. Academic interest in consumer search cost was fostered by the price 
dispersion observed even in markets with seemingly homogenous products. From this 
empirical observation it is intuitive to rationalize costly search as the underlying 
assumption of theoretical models since the time required to survey different sellers 
represents an opportunity cost to consumers. Despite the importance of consumer search 
behavior there are still few empirical measures of search costs in individual markets or 
industries.  
The main goal of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of price dispersion 
by measuring consumer search costs in airline markets. Two distinct features of this 
industry suggest that consumer search costs might be important. First, consumers face a 
large array of fares, and second, there is considerable dispersion both within and across 
routes. For instance, Borenstein and Rose (1994) calculate the expected difference of 
fares between two passengers randomly chosen on the same route as 36 percent of the 
mean fare. Some within route differences can be explained by ticket characteristics 
associated with price discrimination or scarcity pricing.  Still, part of the remaining 
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difference is likely explained by search frictions consumers confront while booking 
airline tickets. In this work we recover search cost estimates of consumers in airline 
markets consistent with theoretical search models.  
The present paper fits in the emerging literature on the structural estimation of 
consumer search models and builds on the work of Hong and Shum (2006). Their main 
insight is that the observed price distribution can be rationalized as an equilibrium 
outcome where profit maximizing firms respond to costly consumer search by using 
mixed pricing strategies. Hong and Shum show that restrictions imposed by standard 
search models provide sufficient structure to recover search cost estimates from pricing 
data alone. In our case, using only price data requires working with a group of similar 
tickets. Our unique dataset allows us to utilize this framework since it contains 
information on transacted fares coupled with detailed ticket characteristics.  
This is the first paper to measure the extent of consumer search cost in the airline 
industry. Previous literature on airline pricing has focused on the role of market 
structure, peak load pricing, scarcity pricing and price discrimination strategies in 
driving price dispersion with little attention to consumer search cost. Our calculations 
suggest that search costs borne by consumers booking airline fares are economically 
important and that they play an important role in explaining part of the price dispersion 
observed in airline markets. Finally, our estimates provide further evidence that concerns 
about market power and policies designed to address these must consider demand side 
characteristics such as consumer search behavior in order to be effective.  
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Results indicate that mean consumer search costs in airline markets vary between 
$8.84 and $27.75 or between 4.8 and 8.1 percent of the mean fare across routes in our 
sample. For certain consumers, however, search costs can be as high as $58. 
Furthermore, we find that most consumers sample only a few fares while a small fraction 
of consumers search intensively. In addition, our estimates are consistent with average 
markups ranging from 30.4% to 52.3% within our ticket group and routes.  
It seems plausible that search costs estimates are higher offline. Our results show 
that consumers booking offline face search costs approximately twice as high as online 
consumers. A possible explanation is that online booking provides a superior search 
process relative to traditional offline travel agents. An alternative interpretation of this 
result is that incentives differ across the two distribution channels. In the case of offline 
booking, travel agents undertake the search process for consumers but face weaker 
incentives than online consumers since they are not spending (saving) their own money.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous work on the 
emerging empirical search cost literature. Section 3 discusses the institutional set up 
including a succinct description of airline pricing and standard contracts in this industry.  
Section 4 describes the structure of the two standard search models. Section 5 describes 
our dataset and empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 
concludes.  
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As noted, there is an abundant theoretical literature on search costs but few 
empirical applications. We would like to review briefly the emerging literature on the 
structural estimation of consumer search models. Our analysis closely follows this 
previous work. 
 Hong and Shum (2006) build an empirical framework to retrieve consumer search 
cost information using only observed prices. First, they assume firms offer a 
homogenous product and that observed price dispersion arises due to variation in 
consumer search costs, caused for example, by varying opportunity costs. Given 
consumers’ search behavior; in equilibrium, profit maximizing firms will use a mixed 
pricing strategy. They show that restrictions imposed by supply and demand models on 
the equilibrium price distribution provide sufficient structure to recover search cost 
estimates from observed prices.  
 More recently, Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2008) develop an oligopolistic 
version of the non-sequential model in Hong and Shum (2006) and pose an alternative 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) approach for estimating this model. Monte Carlo 
simulations show their procedure outperforms Hong and Shum’s Empirical Likelihood 
model both numerically and in goodness-of-fit. In this paper we use the ML procedure 
proposed by Moraga-González and Wildenbeest to estimate the non-sequential model.  
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A well cited paper from this literature is Hortacsu and Syverson (2004).1 This is the 
first work to our knowledge to consider the relative role of product differentiation and 
consumer search cost in driving price dispersion. Using data on mutual funds and market 
shares they find that consumers appear to value observable non-financial features such 
as age, tax exposure and total number of funds in the same fund family and that even 
small search costs can rationalize the fact that the index fund offering the highest utility 
does not capture the whole market.  The main difference with the present work is that we 
recover search cost estimates using only price data; this requires working with a group of 
similar tickets in our case.  
 Wildenbeest (2011) generalizes the model in Moraga-González and Wildenbeest 
(2008). In that article, the author maps a vertical differentiation model into a standard 
homogenous goods model which allows combining mixed strategies in prices and firm 
asymmetries into a single framework. Using price data from supermarkets in the United 
Kingdom, the structure of the equilibrium model is used to estimate both search costs 
and the impact of product differentiation on prices. Results indicate that around 61 
percent of the variation in prices is explained by supermarket heterogeneity, while the 
remaining variation is due to search frictions.  
One of the latest papers is De los Santos, Hortacsu and Wildenbeest (2012). They 
have access to a detailed dataset on the browsing and purchasing behavior of a large 
panel of consumers searching for books online. The availability of such a dataset allows 
the authors to test several predictions of the two benchmark search models. Their results 
                                                 
1 In their model they extend the framework of Carlson and McAfee (1983). 
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show the non-sequential model provides a more accurate description of observed 
consumer search patterns. The sequential model can be rejected on both the recall 
patterns they observe in the data and the absence of dependence of search decisions on 
observed prices. 
  
 7 
 
CHAPTER III  
PRICING AND CONTRACTS IN AIRLINE MARKETS 
 
Consumers booking airline tickets face a large array of fares.2 This fare variation is 
one of the most salient features of the airline industry and of the complex process of 
airline revenue maximization. Airlines face costumers with different willingness to pay, 
therefore, offering different fares allows consumers to self-select themselves 
accordingly. On the other hand, airlines must deal with challenges specific to hospitality 
industries. First, inventory is highly perishable; empty seats lost value at departure. 
Second, airlines experience both stochastic and predictable changes in demand; load 
factors for specific flights are subject to random shocks and demand varies predictably 
along different time frames – for instance, peak hours during the day and holidays - . All 
these factors make revenue maximization by carriers a challenging task. Next, we 
discuss the two main components of airlines revenue maximization.  
The first component of airlines revenue maximization is differential pricing or the 
practice of offering various “fare products” with different characteristics for travel on a 
common city-pair. These characteristics include features such as class of travel, 
refundability, travel and stay restrictions and advance purchase requirements.3 
Differential pricing allows carriers to screen consumers and separate them into different 
                                                 
2 We logged on to one of the biggest online travel agencies to search for a roundtrip ticket to travel from 
DFW to JFK three weeks before departure. We found eighty one different fares to travel on the same day 
and return one week later. 
3 These different combinations of fares and ticket characteristics are commonly referred to as “bins” or 
“buckets” in the revenue management literature.  
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groups according to their price and time elasticities - e.g., business and leisure travelers – 
and search costs. In addition, fare departments make pricing decisions for the different 
groups of tickets several months in advance.  
The second component of revenue maximization is yield management. Yield (or 
revenue) management consists in the process of determining the number of seats made 
available in each “fare group” previously defined by the fare department. Essentially, 
yield management is seat inventory control. Carriers would like to sell as many seats as 
possible but each sale of a discount ticket forgoes the opportunity to sell that seat at a 
higher price. Therefore, the main purpose of yield management is to “protect” seats for 
potential high-priced late booking passengers while ensuring the highest possible load 
factor. This process requires airlines to balance the tradeoff between capacity utilization 
rates and revenues per passenger.4 
After different fare bins have been priced by the fare department and the number of 
tickets in each bin has been assigned by yield management, carriers make fares available 
through Computer Reservation Systems (CRSs). Vendors in this industry, which include 
traditional offline travel agents, online sellers such as Orbitz and Expedia, and airline 
websites, access fares through a CRS. Hence, all fares are made available through 
Computer Reservation Systems (CRSs).  
The distribution of fares faced by travel agents is governed through a series of 
contracts. During our sample period, the fourth quarter of 2004, the standard contracts 
                                                 
4 See Belobaba, Odoni and Barnhart (2009), Chapter 4, for a detailed discussion.  
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used by carriers included Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clauses granting agents access to 
all fares offered by carriers.  
MFN clauses play a key role in our framework since they mean that there existed 
only a single price vector offered by firms which the bilateral MFN clauses require to be 
available both online and offline. Passengers searching for airline fares would sample 
from this single price vector regardless of whether they are searching online or offline. 
As a result, firms would recognize that the set of consumers and their associated costs 
would be the search costs of the entire distribution of consumers searching the entire, 
single price vector. This means that the search cost distribution of consumers faced by 
firms consists of the union of search costs of consumers searching both online and 
offline. For this reason, the institutional set-up requires the estimation of a single search 
cost distribution.  
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CHAPTER IV  
SEARCH MODELS 
 
The basic assumption of search models is that search is a costly activity since the 
time required to sample prices entails an opportunity cost for consumers. Costly search 
induces consumers to keep searching until the marginal cost of search equals its 
marginal benefit – in our set-up, the marginal benefit corresponds the expected savings 
of sampling an additional price - . As an abstraction of real consumers’ behavior, search 
strategies in these models might not fit particular search habits. Still, they are useful as a 
general description of demand behavior when price dispersion is driven by search cost 
heterogeneity in the population of consumers.  
The two benchmark models in this literature are the non-sequential and sequential 
search models.5 The main difference between the models regards consumer search 
strategies. In the non-sequential model, consumers choose the number of price quotes to 
obtain, or alternatively, the number of times to search, and then buy at the lowest 
sampled price. This assumption is generally motivated by the argument that there is a 
fixed component of search costs. The sequential model assumes instead that consumers 
keep searching until the last price found is not greater than their reservation price.6 Both 
models take the optimality of search strategies as given and confer little guidance on 
which of the two offers a better description of consumers search practices in a specific 
                                                 
5 The non-sequential model is also referred to as the fixed-sample search model.  
6 Sequential search is the standard assumption in job-search models in labor economics.  
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empirical set-up. Some authors have maintained that a particular strategy might be 
preferred. For example, Manning and Morgan (1985) suggest that non-sequential search 
may provide a better description of the search process when there is a fixed cost 
component to search. 
Here, we take consumer search strategies as given and retrieve search costs 
estimates consistent with both models. A more general model in which consumer choose 
their search strategy first is beyond the scope of this paper.  
IV A. The Sequential Model 
As discussed by Stahl (1989) most of the work in the sequential-search literature 
seems to have been motivated by the desire for a model in which price differences 
among stores could be explained as an equilibrium outcome. There was the need to fill 
the gap between the Bertrand and the “Diamond (1971) paradox” results. In the first 
case, if consumers can search costlessly (i.e., they are fully informed of the price set by 
each store) then the unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the competitive price. On the other 
hand, if search costs are non-negative, then the unique NE is the monopoly price. As a 
consequence, subsequent models featuring fully optimizing consumers and firms were 
developed producing mixed-strategy NE in prices which are interpreted as price 
dispersion. 
Hong and Shum (2006) follow the work of Albrecht and Axell (1984), Stahl (1989) 
and Rob (1985) and postulate a theoretical model with heterogeneous search costs in 
order to generate a non-degenerate equilibrium price distribution. The intuition is that 
with heterogeneity in consumer search costs attributable to differences in their 
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opportunity cost of searching, low-price firms more often serve consumers with low 
search costs, and high price firms more often serve consumers with high search costs. 
Nevertheless, as explained by the authors heterogeneity in consumer search costs is not 
sufficient to ensure the existence of a continuous equilibrium price distribution.  
There is a set of restrictions on the population search-cost distribution that are 
required for non-degenerate equilibrium price dispersion in the sequential search model.7 
In particular, Theorem 4 in Rob (1985) shows that for a continuous equilibrium price 
distribution to exist, it must satisfy an equation like (5) below. Therefore, we can either 
verify that the function in (5) is a valid CDF or we can check if the likelihood function in 
(4) is a proper density function – that is, positive along its support – to check for the 
existence of a continuous price distribution.  
In this model, consumer search strategy consists in choosing whether to buy at the 
lowest price found so far or sample an additional price, that is, there is an option value 
associated to searching again which resembles an “optimal stopping” problem.  
There is a continuum of risk-neutral sellers producing a homogenous product at a 
constant marginal cost r. As discussed in Hong and Shum (2006) working only with 
price data does not allow for the estimation of both the distribution of search costs and 
marginal costs. Still, heterogeneity in marginal costs is not sufficient to generate price 
dispersion; high search cost consumers are required for high marginal cost vendors to 
                                                 
7
 Rob’s Theorem 3 states that a sufficient condition for nonexistence of a continuous equilibrium price 
distribution is that the search-cost density vanishes in some positive interval [0, A) with A > 0. In our case, 
we avoid this issue by assuming that search costs are distributed according to the Weibull distribution, 
which has support [0, ). 
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sell at a high price. Each firm maximizes expected revenues by optimally choosing a 
price, p. Let the resulting equilibrium price distribution be F(p) with bounds   and  ̅. 
Similarly, the model assumes there is a continuum of buyers with differential search 
costs; c, randomly drawn from Fc the distribution of consumers search costs. A 
consumer with a cost per search of ci will not stop searching until encountering a price 
z*(ci) that satisfies the following indifference condition:   
                 
             (1)
 
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. This indifference condition 
states that the consumer will stop searching when her search cost ci equals her marginal 
benefit, which consists of the expected savings from making an additional search having 
observed z. Note that z*(ci) is increasing in c. Define the reservation price for each ci as: 
 
          (2)
 
Now denote G the distribution of reservation prices in the population, given Fc and 
the mapping (2). Note that there is fraction of consumers with reservation price  ̅,  
 α = 1 - G( ̅), and that G( ) = 0. 
The equilibrium price distribution is defined by the firms' indifference condition. 
Suppose consumer i has reservation price   
 . A firm charging  ̂ will only sell to 
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consumers i for whom  ̂    
 . Since we assume firms are symmetric, a firm's demand at 
price   ̂ is proportional to (1 - G( ̂)). Thus, the firms' indifference condition is:  
 
        (3) 
IV B. Sequential-search Model Estimation 
Equation (3) defines n-1 equations for each of the n-1 observed prices excluding   ̅. 
However, there are n unknowns: G(p1 =  ),G(p2),…,G(pn-1),G(pn =  ̅).Thus, the model is 
under identified and additional assumptions are required for estimation. Hong and Shum 
(2006) propose a Maximum Likelihood estimation procedure for this model by assuming 
that the search cost CDF, Fc(.;θ), follows a parametric distribution family with 
parameters vector θ. After some algebraic manipulation, the likelihood function for each 
price can be derived as: 8 
             
(4) 
 
With corresponding equilibrium price CDF: 
  
(5)              
   
     
 
                                                 
8 Derivation of the likelihood function is presented in the Appendix.  
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In the above equations, we denote          
       , the inverse CDF of the 
search cost distribution. Given θ, the auxiliary parameters α and r can be solved as 
follows: first, the proportion of consumers with reservation price equal to  ̅, can be 
solved from the initial condition G( ) = 0 and the indifference condition of the firm as: 
      
(6) 
 
On the other hand, selling cost r can be determined by the condition that Fp(p) = 1. 
Therefore, given θ and equations (5) and (6), r must satisfy: 
 
(7) 
 
 
The likelihood function for the whole sample of prices, then, is        ∏          .
  
As discussed above, a necessary condition for the existence of a non-degenerate 
continuous equilibrium price distribution for this model within an interval [ , ̅] is that 
the price CDF in (5) is nondecreasing in this range, or equivalently, that the likelihood 
function (4) be positive for all p ϵ [ , ̅]. This is a strong condition since it requires after 
examining equation (4) that the search cost density fc to be strictly decreasing in the 
range [    
 ̅   
  ̅   
     . 
In this paper, we use the Weibull distribution for the search cost distribution. 
Besides its flexible shape the Weibull distribution is one of the few two-parameter 
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distributions that allows for the density to be strictly decreasing along its full support. 
For the Weibull density,  
                                     |       
  
  
(
 
  
)
    
      ⁄  
                     
 
the decreasing density condition restricts θ2 ≤ 1. This restriction has important 
implications for the results as we discussed further in the next section.  
IV C. The Non-sequential Model 
The following discussion is based on Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2008). 
They study an oligopolistic version of the model proposed in Hong and Shum (2006). 
Hong and Shum generalize the non-sequential search model of Burdett and Judd (1983) 
by adding search cost heterogeneity.  
 The basic structure of the model is as follows. There are N retailers selling a 
homogenous good with a common unit selling cost r. There is a unit mass of buyers who 
differ in their search costs which are randomly drawn from Fc, the consumers search cost 
distribution. Consumers have inelastic demand and buy one unit of the product. Let  ̅ be 
the consumer valuation for the good.  A standard assumption of search models is that 
consumers obtain a first price quote at random for free. Beyond the first price, a 
consumer incurs a search cost c per additional price quote. Therefore, consumer with 
search cost c incurs in total search cost c*i.  
Following the notation in Burdett and Judd (1983), denote the symmetric mixed 
strategy equilibrium by the distribution of prices Fp, with density fp(p). Let   and  ̅ be 
the lower and upper bound of the support of Fp. Given the behavior of firms, consumer 
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with search cost c will choose optimally the number of prices i(c) she observes in order 
to minimize total search costs c*(i-1), i.e.: 
 
(8) 
                                                                        
since i(c) must be an integer, this search strategy splits consumers into N subsets of size 
qi, i = 1, 2,…,N, with ∑   
 
     ; then, qi is the fraction of buyers sampling i stores 
(prices) and is strictly positive for all i. This partition is computed as follows. For the 
consumer indifferent between sampling i and i+1 firms it must hold that her search cost 
equals:  
 (9) 
 
here Ep1:i denotes the expected minimum price in a sample of i prices drawn from the 
price distribution Fp. Note that i is decreasing in c. Using this property, the fractions of 
consumers qi sampling i prices are then: 
 
(10) 
 
 
 
Figure 1 presents a graphical illustration. Assume this graph depicts the recovered 
search cost distribution; q1 and Δ1 represent the fraction of consumers who do not incur 
in any search and their corresponding search cost, respectively. Similarly, q2 is the 
fraction of consumers who survey at most two prices before buying and Δ2 denotes their 
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corresponding search cost. Note from the graph that Δi should be interpreted as a lower 
bound for the search cost since it coincides with the search cost of the marginal 
consumer who is just indifferent between searching i prices and i+1 prices. Also notice 
that we can only identify the shape of the search-cost distribution up to the 1 – F(Δ1) 
percentile. 
Turning to the firms’ problem, the upper bound of the price distribution must be  ̅ 
since a firm charging this price will only sell to consumers who do not incur in any 
search, i.e., consumers in q1, who do not compare prices and accept to buy at  ̅. For the 
equilibrium price distribution to represent a mixed strategy equilibrium, firms must be 
indifferent between charging the highest price,  ̅, and any other price in the support of 
Fp. Therefore, the equilibrium condition is: 
 
(11) 
  
 
 From this equilibrium condition, it follows that the minimum price charged in the 
market is: 
(12) 
 
Hong and Shum (2006) show that equations (8) to (12) provide enough structure to 
retrieve information on search costs using only price data for the non-sequential model. 
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IV D. Non-sequential Model Estimation 
 
Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2008) proposed to estimate the {Δi,qi} for i = 
1,..., N pairs of the search cost distribution by Maximum Likelihood as follows since 
equation (11) cannot be solved analytically for the equilibrium price distribution Fp 
which makes it difficult to calculate the cutoff points: 
 
  
  
In their work Hong and Shum (2006) propose to use the observed price distribution 
to calculate the Δi’s. Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2008) through Monte Carlo 
simulations show that, although practical, this procedure does not necessarily provide 
minimal variance estimates. Therefore, they propose an alternative method to obtain ML 
estimates of the search cost distribution cutoff points. To do this, we have to rewrite first 
Δi as a function of the ML estimates of the parameters of the price distribution. 
Integrating by parts, we first rewrite the cutoff points as: 
 
   (13) 
  
Since Fp is monotonically increasing in p, its inverse exists so we can use equation 
(11) to solve for p as: 
   
(14) 
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Using (14) and a change of variables equation (9) can be written as:  
 
 
(15) 
 
Therefore, given ML estimates of r,  ,  ̅, and qi, i = 1, 2,...,N, we can use equations 
(14) and (15) to obtain ML estimates of the cut-off  points of the search cost distribution 
by the invariance property of ML estimation. 
Now, to obtain estimates of r,  ,  ̅, and qi, i = 1, 2,...,N, by ML using only price 
data we first apply the implicit function theorem to equation (11), which yields: 
 
(16) 
 
 
 
Let’s order the vector of observed prices in ascending order p1, p2,…,pM. We use p1 
and pM as estimates of the lower and upper bounds of the support of the price 
distribution   and  ̅, respectively.9 Using these, we can solve for the marginal cost as a 
function of the other parameters using equation (12) above: 
 
(17) 
 
 
                                                 
9   and   ̅ converge super consistently to the true bound of the price distribution. See Donald and Paarsch 
(1993) for further discussion. 
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Finally, plugging r into the density function in (16) and using the fact that      
 ∑   
   
     the next maximum likelihood problem can be solved numerically: 
 
(18) 
 
where 
 
 
The standard errors of the estimates of qi, i = 1, 2,...,N-1 are calculated by taking the 
square root of the diagonal entries of the inverse of the negative Hessian matrix 
evaluated at the optimum as usual. Standard errors of qN, r and Δi’s  can be computed by 
the Delta method.  
The estimation procedure work as follows. Given arbitrary starting values  {  
 }   
   . 
Then for every price    in the data set,        is calculated using the equilibrium 
condition (11), which in turn allows us to calculate        using (16). A Preconditioned 
Conjugate Gradient (PCG) method is then used which change the      until the log-
likelihood function is maximized.  
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CHAPTER V  
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
V A. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Our dataset contains all online and offline ticket transactions made through one of 
the major CRS for the fourth quarter of 2004 and represents roughly thirty percent of all 
domestic tickets sold in the U.S. during that period. Fares booked to travel after 
December 22nd through the end of year are excluded as well as those booked the 
Wednesday before Thanksgiving through the following Sunday. Data spans transactions 
from offline travel agents, airline websites and several online booking sites. This first 
database includes airline and flight number, origin and destination, fare, booking class, a 
fare code, and dates of purchase, departure and return but does not include information 
on ticket characteristics.  
Ticket characteristics were retrieved from another CRS archive containing both 
fares offered and purchased for travel in particular city-pairs organized by departure, 
airline, and city-pair. From this second data set we collect information on carrier, origin 
and destination, departure date, fare, booking class, advance purchase requirements, 
refundability, travel restrictions, and minimum and maximum stay restrictions for each 
fare. These data were then matched to the transactions database. The criterion used in the 
matching process was to keep a transaction if this could be matched to a fare in the 
second dataset within two percent; for multiple matches within two percent the closest 
was kept. Additional details of the matching process are presented in Sengupta and 
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Wiggins (2013) where they also present evidence that this procedure did not introduce 
major selection issues.  The availability of such a dataset allows us to utilize the 
theoretical framework presented in the previous section since retrieving search cost 
information using only price data requires a sample of consumers booking a group of 
similar tickets.  
Airline tickets can be grouped in a price ascending order in four main categories: 
non-refundable and restricted fares, non-refundable and non-restricted fares, refundable 
and non-restricted fares and first class. We work in this paper with non-refundable and 
restricted tickets. In general, this is the cheapest category of fares and the typical ticket 
booked by leisure travelers, the most price sensitive and time insensitive group of 
consumers. Leisure or vacation travelers are willing to meet basically any travel and 
ticket conditions in order to pay the lowest fare. Given these characteristics, our model’s 
assumption of symmetric firms serving consumers who search for the lowest fare seems 
appropriate. The latter becomes more relevant in the actual setup as we do not consider 
substitution across carriers. Worries about carriers’ choice and consumer loyalty should 
be more of a concern for higher priced ticket groups, especially, first class and 
refundable and non-restricted fares.10  
Our dataset contains information on 250 domestic routes defined at the airport-pair 
level regardless of direction. The routes in this paper were selected based on the number 
of observations within our ticket group in the transactions dataset from the first CRS. 
                                                 
10 Following Wildenbeest (2011), it can be argued that the fraction of consumers searching only once can 
be interpreted as carrier loyal customers; therefore, up to some extent loyalty can be accommodated in our 
setting. 
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The prices used are for roundtrip fares only excluding itineraries with open-jaws and 
circular trip tickets and include tickets for flights operated by American Airlines, 
Continental, Delta, Northwest, US Airways, United Airlines, Frontier, Air Tran, Spirit, 
Alaska, America West, Sun Country, Hawaiian Airlines and American Trans Air.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics of fares in our ticket group for the four routes 
included in this work: ATL-ORD, DTW-LGA, ORD-PHX and ORD-SFO.11 The first 
row presents summary statistics for all observations in these routes, and the next two 
rows, for offline and online transactions separately. The information on this table 
suggests that consumers booking airline tickets in these markets have incentives to 
search given the potential savings from sampling additional fares. Standard deviations 
range from 15% to 30% of the mean route fare across routes. Additionally, summary 
statistics indicate that online fares present lower means than offline fares and less 
dispersion in general.  
Within our ticket group, non-refundable and restricted fares, we limit the sample to 
tickets booked eight to fourteen days before departure. This lessens the concerns of 
availability and potential price changes by airlines as a response to unexpected increases 
in bookings occurring during the last seven days prior departure. Table 2 presents 
summary statistics of fares in our ticket group for the 8-10 day window and the 11-14 
day window before departure. As you can see from the table summary statistics are very 
close across the two windows; mean and median fares in the 8-10 day window are not 
                                                 
11 ATL: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport; DTW: Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County 
Airport; LGA: La Guardia Airport; ORD: Chicago O’Hare International Airport; PHX: Phoenix Sky 
Harbor International Airport; SFO: San Francisco International Airport.  
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more than 3 percent higher than mean and median fares for the second window. Only for 
the ORD-SFO route the 8-10 day window mean fare is approximately 5 percent higher 
although this difference is not statistically significant.  
Previous papers in general use information on posted prices. This raises two 
potential concerns. First, posted prices might bias upwards search cost estimates if high 
price quotes do not generate any trade; and second, “bait and switch” practices in which 
firms post low prices just to attract potential consumers could induce a downward bias in 
recovered search costs. We avoid these issues by working with ticket transactions.  
We are using the distribution of observed transactions during the second week 
before departure as a proxy for the unknown price distribution at every point in time 
during the second week before departure in our sample period. Therefore, we are 
assuming the same fares are available throughout this period. As discussed in section 3, 
fare departments set prices for the different ticket groups far in advance the flying date, 
and also, yield management implies that some fares might become unavailable at some 
point before departure. This might generate an upward bias in search cost estimates since 
we do not observe stock outs. Still, the fact that we consistently observe in the dataset 
consumers booking fares in the cheapest group even up to the last day before departure 
is evidence that these fares are available through the whole sample period.  
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CHAPTER VI  
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
VI A. Sequential Model Results 
 
In this section we present results for the sequential search model. The equilibrium 
condition of firms in the sequential model defines n-1 equations, one for each of the n 
observed prices excluding the highest price.12 However, there are n unknowns; the n 
percentiles of the reservation price distribution corresponding to each of the n observed 
prices. As a consequence, additional assumptions are required to estimate this model. 
Hong and Shum (2006) propose to estimate this model by MLE assuming the search cost 
distribution Fc is parameterized by a finite vector θ. Note that by assuming a functional 
form for the search cost distribution we can extrapolate the entire search cost 
distribution.  
As just mentioned, ML estimation of the sequential model implies specifying a 
functional form for the search costs pdf. Moreover, model derivation requires the 
assumed function to be decreasing along all of its support in order for the density of 
prices to be a valid pdf.13 Only a few distribution families satisfy this restriction. For this 
work we explored different specifications using the Weibull, the gamma and the log-
normal distributions. Results were similar across the different specifications.  
                                                 
12 See equation 3 in section 4.  
13 See equation 4.  
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Table 3 presents results for the four routes using the Weibull distribution. Columns 
1 and 2 present the estimates of the shape and scale parameter respectively. The table 
also shows results for the mean and the median of search costs, the fraction of 
consumers who do not incur in any search and their corresponding search cost estimate. 
Note the high search cost means and the large search cost estimates for α, the fraction of 
consumers who do not search. Results show that search costs borne by consumers in this 
group start at US$255.5 in the ORD-SFO route. In three of the four cases these search 
cost estimates are above the mean route fare.  
As discussed in Hong and Shum (2006), these high sequential search cost estimates 
can be explained by the behavior of the parametric families we consider. The restriction 
imposed on the shape parameter of the parametric distribution in order for the slope of 
the search cost density to be negative along all of its support makes this density to die-
off very slowly.14 
Recovered estimates from this model exceed reasonable expectations for consumers 
search costs in these markets. For this reason, discussion of results in this paper is based 
on non-sequential search costs estimates.  
VI B. Non-Sequential Model Results 
This section presents the estimates of the non-sequential model for the four routes in 
our sample. The estimates from this model are search cost distribution pairs {qi, Δi} for i 
= 1, 2,…,N, these are, the fractions of consumers who search i prices and their 
                                                 
14 The Weibull distribution is decreasing in all its support conditional on the shape parameter being less or 
equal to 1. 
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corresponding search cost estimate in dollars. Recall that Δi’s should be interpreted as 
lower bounds - consumers who search i prices must realize search costs of at least Δi - 
and also that we can only identify the shape of the search-cost distribution up to the 1 – 
F(Δ1) percentile. 
To estimate this model we use the MLE procedure in Moraga-González and 
Wildenbeest (2008). One of the insights of their estimation procedure is that once we 
have obtained ML estimates of the qi’s, that is, the fractions of consumers searching i 
prices, for i = 1, 2,…,N, we can obtain corresponding ML of the search cost estimates, 
Δi’s, by first rewriting prices as a function of the qi’s.
15 We can then compute standard 
errors using the Delta method as usual. 
Table 4 presents the results for the non-sequential model. Columns 2 through 4 
contain the ML estimates for each route: p1 and v correspond to the route lowest and 
highest observed fare, respectively; N is the number of unique fares rounded to the 
closest integer and M is the number of observations for the sample period in our ticket 
group. Next we present ML estimates for the fraction of consumers searching i prices: q1 
is the fraction of consumers that do not incur in any search, q2 is the fraction of 
consumers searching at most two prices and so forth, up to qn, which represents the 
fraction of consumers who search exhaustively. Additionally, the table presents the 
estimate for the marginal cost r, the value of the log-likelihood function and the 
computed value for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic which test the null hypothesis that 
the vector of estimated and observed fares belong to the same continuous distribution. 
                                                 
15 See equations 14 and 15 in section 4. 
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Panel B below shows the corresponding ML estimates for the search cost values for each 
qi. The numbers in parenthesis correspond to the standard errors of estimates.   
Results show that consumers incur in little search overall. The estimate for q1 is 
0.25, 0.21, 0.21 and 0.35 for each of the four routes, respectively. In the case of ATL-
ORD, the estimate for q2 is 0.66 which means that 91 percent of consumers search at 
most two prices before buying on this route. Doing a similar exercise across the other 
three routes the reader can verify that 81 and 90 percent of consumers search at most 
seven prices on the DTW-LGA and ORD-PHX routes, respectively, and that 
approximately 90 percent of consumers search four prices at a maximum on the ORD-
SFO route. Air travelers who search intensively account for less than 10 percent, 
excluding DTW-LGA, where this fraction is 19 percent. Estimates are statistically 
significant in general and all other qi’s are not statistically different from zero. This 
result is consistent with previous findings in other markets; most consumers incur in 
little search while a small proportion of consumers search intensively.  
As can been seen from panel B, consumers who do not search must bear search 
costs of at least US$ 18.38 on the ATL-ORD route, whereas, on the ORD-SFO route this 
number is at least US$ 58.35. Alternatively, expected savings from sampling at least two 
prices are US$ 18.38 on the ATL-ORD route and US$ 58.35 on the ORD-SFO route. On 
the other hand, consumers who are indifferent between sampling two or three prices 
realize search costs of US$ 6.43 in the first route and US$ 28.08 on the fourth route – 
that is, expected savings from adding a third price to the search vary between US$ 6.43 
and US$ 28.08 across the four routes - . All estimates are highly significant. The last row 
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in panel B shows that the route weighted mean search cost ranges from US$ 8.84 in the 
ATL-ORD route up to US$ 27.75 in the ORD-SFO route, or, 4.8 and 8.1 percent of the 
respective mean route fare.  
We also recover estimates of the marginal cost r; all estimates are within 6 percent 
of the lowest observed fare. These marginal cost estimates are consistent with average 
markups across routes ranging from 30.4 to 52.3 percent. This result is notable 
considering we are working with a narrowly defined ticket group and characteristics 
such as class of travel, refundability, and travel restrictions have already been 
considered. 
Finally, we compare consumers search costs offline and online, ex-post we first 
calculate the fares corresponding to each search cost cutoff point and then obtain the 
percentages of transactions between these fares offline and online separately. Next, we 
compute a weighted search cost by multiplying these percentages by the corresponding 
search cost cutoff point. Again, these should be interpreted as lower bound estimates for 
search costs online and offline.  Table 5 presents the results. Offline consumers bear 
search costs at least 71 percent higher than online consumers across these markets. In all 
four routes offline search costs nearly double online estimates as a percentage of the 
mean route fare. An interpretation of this result could be that online booking offers a less 
costly search mechanism relative to offline travel agents. It is also plausible that this 
difference is explained by different incentives across the two distribution channels. 
Offline travel agents making the search for consumers face weaker incentives to search 
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since they are not spending (saving) their own money, while online consumers, spending 
their own money, face greater incentives to search.  
  
 32 
 
CHAPTER VII  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper recover search cost estimates of consumers booking airline fares. Results 
show that the magnitude of search costs borne by consumers in our ticket group is 
economically important specially if we consider that this ticket group is usually booked 
by leisure travelers, arguably the segment of air travelers with lower search costs in 
general. Specifically, average search costs estimates range between $8.84 and $27.75 
across the four routes in our sample – or between 4.8 and 8.1 percent of the route mean 
fare - and can be at least as high as $58.4 for consumers who do not search in one of the 
markets examined in this paper. With respect to the amount of search consumers 
engaged in, our results are consistent with previous findings in other markets; most 
consumers incur in little search and a small fraction of consumers search intensively. 
Additionally, recovered marginal costs allow us to compute estimates of average mark-
ups within routes. These estimates vary between 30.4 and 52.3 percent across routes 
included in this work. 
Results also indicate that consumers booking online realize lower search costs than 
consumers booking via traditional offline agents. This result seems intuitive as the 
internet might offer a less costly search process to consumers booking online, and also as 
agents face different incentives across the two distribution channels. Consumers booking 
online have higher incentives to search and book the cheapest available fares since they 
are paying for the ticket, whereas, offline travel agents undertaking the search process 
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for consumers face weaker incentives to search as much since they are not spending their 
own money. However, these results should be interpreted cautiously. The choice of 
distribution channel is an endogenous process so we cannot readily interpret that 
differences in search costs online and offline arise from inherently higher or lower costs 
for either channel. This result might also be explained because of a combination of 
opportunity costs, internet familiarity and other differences between the two groups of 
consumers.  
This paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature estimating search cost 
estimates consistent with theoretical search models. This is the first paper to recover 
consumer search cost estimates in the airline markets. Regarding the literature on airline 
pricing, extensive theoretical and empirical work has addressed the roles of market 
structure, peak-load pricing, scarcity pricing theories and price discrimination strategies 
in driving price dispersion. So far, little attention has been devoted to consumer search 
behavior in these markets. Our results suggest that consumer search cost plays an 
important role in driving part of the price dispersion observed in this industry.   
In general, policies designed to address market power concerns have focused on 
supply side factors. Results from this recent literature including this work suggest that 
demand factors such as consumer search behavior are also of practical importance. 
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Figure 1 - Identification Scheme for Search-Cost Distribution in Non-Sequential 
Search Model 
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       Figure 3 - Fares Distribution DTW-LGA 
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               Figure 5 - Fares Distribution ORD-SFO 
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                                 Figure 6 - ATL-ORD Sequential Estimation                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
          Figure 7 - DTW-LGA Sequential Estimation 
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                                  Figure 8 - ORD-PHX Sequential Estimation                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
                         Figure 9 - ORD-SFO Sequential Estimation  
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                               Figure 10 - ATL–ORD Non Sequential Estimation                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
       Figure 11 - DTW-LGA Non Sequential Estimation                   
 43 
 
                               Figure 12 - ORD-PHX Non Sequential Estimation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
                               Figure 13 - ORD-SFO Non Sequential Estimation 
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Table 1 - Summary Fare Statistics by Route 
 
 
 
                            Table 2 - Summary Fare Statistics by Time Window 
 
 
 
  
Route
Day 
window
Obs Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median Min Max
8 -10 463 189.2 28.6 183.0 133.1 303.0
11 - 14 610 183.9 27.3 180.0 133.1 303.0
8 -10 460 194.0 38.8 185.7 126.9 292.6
11 - 14 681 193.5 34.2 182.0 129.0 296.7
8 -10 370 240.7 59.5 248.0 140.2 473.1
11 - 14 584 240.5 60.7 248.0 142.5 498.0
8 -10 376 351.9 101.1 341.5 162.2 497.3
11 - 14 518 334.4 101.6 322.2 158.3 507.7
ATL - ORD
DTW - LGA
ORD - PHX
ORD - SFO
Route Obs Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median Min Max
All 1,073 186.2 28.0 180.0 133.0 303.0
Offline 953 188.1 28.5 183.0 133.0 303.0
Online 120 171.0 44.6 166.0 139.0 234.0
All 1,141 193.7 49.1 181.9 126.9 296.7
Offline 928 189.8 33.8 217.8 126.9 296.7
Online 213 171.4 37.6 155.9 129.0 280.0
All 954 240.6 60.2 248.0 140.2 498.0
Offline 854 244.0 60.9 248.0 140.2 498.0
Online 100 211.6 44.6 198.0 142.5 338.0
All 894 341.8 101.7 326.5 158.3 507.7
Offline 790 351.0 101.8 337.1 158.3 507.7
Online 104 271.8 68.8 266.3 163.0 492.2
ATL - ORD
DTW - LGA
ORD - PHX
ORD - SFO
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Route
θ1 θ2
Mean 
Search 
Cost
Median 
Search 
Cost
α
ATL - ORD 0.012 0.293 123.8 3.4 0.1457 112.4
DTW - LGA 0.04 0.331 246.5 13.2 0.2544 103.3
ORD - SFO 0.034 0.256 209.2 8.1 0.2188 174.3
ORD - PHX 0.025 0.305 215.2 7.5 0.1311 255.5
  
       
Table 3 - Sequential Model Estimates 
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Table 4 - Non-sequential Model Estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
     
ATL - ORD DTW - LGA ORD - PHX ORD - SFO
p 1 133 127 140 158
v 303 297 498 508
N 72 90 111 118
M 1,073 1,141 954 894
q 1 0.25 (0.02) 0.21 (0.06) 0.21 (0.03) 0.35 (0.05)
q 2 0.66 (0.01) 0.26 (0.03) 0.50 (0.08) 0.10 (0.02)
q 4 . . . 0.45 (0.02)
q 6 . . 0.13 (0.31) .
q 7 . 0.34 (0.05) 0.06 (0.33) .
. . . . .
q 72 0.09 (0.03) . . .
q 90 0.19 (0.16) . .
q 111 0.10 (0.09) .
q 118 0.09 (0.07)
r 127.62 (0.42) 125.19 (0.52) 135.52 (0.81) 148.74 (1.37)
avg mark-up 0.304 0.329 0.404 0.523
LL 4,805.00 5,651.46 5,166.86 5,058.05
KS 3.26 5.52 4.28 2.65
Δ 1 18.38 (0.31) 25.05 (2.11) 41.80 (7.16) 58.35 (0.59)
Δ 2 6.43 (0.25) 11.50 (2.15) 15.54 (2.55) 28.08 (1.02)
Δ 3 3.31 (0.17) 6.67 (1.57) 8.24 (2.36) 15.89 (0.93)
Δ 4 2.11 (0.12) 4.36 (1.14) 5.25 (2.35) 10.05 (0.75)
Δ 5 1.53 (0.10) 3.08 (0.85) 3.72 (2.21) 6.89 (0.60)
Δ 6 1.20 (0.08) 2.28 (065) 2.83 (2.03) 5.04 (0.48)
Δ 7 1.00 (0.07) 1.76 (0.51) 2.25 (1.84) 3.87 (0.40)
Δ 8 0.86 (0.06) 1.41 (0.39)  1.86 (1.76) 3.09 (0.33)
Δ 9 0.76 (0.06) 1.15 (0.33)  1.58 (1.60) 2.55 (0.29)
Δ 10  0.69 (0.05) 0.96 (0.27) 1.36 (1.46) 2.16 (0.25)
SC mean 8.84 8.85 17.05 27.75
Panel A - ML Estimates of the Non-Sequential Search Model
Panel B - ML Estimates of the Non-Sequential Search Model
 47 
 
Route
SC offline                          
(US$ - % mean route fare)
SC online                         
(US$ - % mean route fare)
ATL - ORD 9.19 (4.9%) 5.05 (2.7%)
DTW - LGA 16.74 (8.6%) 9.10 (4.7%)
ORD - PHX 22.20 (9.2%) 13.00 (5.4%)
ORD - SFO 35.03 (10.2%) 18.26 (5.3%)
Table 5 - Search Costs Estimates Offline and Online 
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APPENDIX B  
DERIVATION OF LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION FOR THE SEQUENTIAL MODEL 
 
Given α and r, we can estimate the τth quantile of the reservation price distribution, 
denoted   ̅
         , using the indifference condition (8): 
 
 
 
Let   
        dente the τth quantile of the parameterized cost distribution, where θ 
denotes the parameters of this distribution that we wish to estimate. By the consumers’ 
reservation price condition, we know that  
 
 
 
And therefore 
 
 
 
In what follows, let        denote the τth quantile of                            
  . Changing variables from   to      [  ̅       ⁄     we can derive the price 
CDF corresponding to  ,  , and r,  
 
 
 49 
 
with a corresponding density function         that can be derived by differentiating the 
above with respect to p: 
  
  
The maximum likelihood estimates for the θ parameters are estimated by 
maximizing the sample log-likelihood function  ∑            . The variance-covariance 
matrix of the estimates is approximated by the inverse of the sample analog of the outer 
product of the gradient vector: 
 
 
where the gradient vector for each observation i is, in turn, approximated by numerical 
derivatives.  
 
